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Abstract
In this paper I analyze the effects of the mergers between Delta-Northwest and 
Continental-United on airfares. I use data from before the announcement of the mergers 
to model prices and then forecast what prices would have been after the mergers had 
the mergers not occurred. 
By comparing the actual observed fares and the predicted fares, I find that fares are 
lower than predicted during the periods of the mergers’ announcements and higher 
than predicted afterwards. Overall, fares after the announcement of the merger are 
higher than predicted, and market power effects from the merger dominate efficiency 
gains. However, I find that several variables do not have the effect on airfares that one 
would expect.
I. Introduction
 In this paper, I explore how airline mergers in the United States in the past 
decade have affected airfares. Specifically, I look at Delta’s acquisition of Northwest 
Airlines between 2008 and 2010, and United Airline’s acquisition of Continental 
Airlines in 2010. Delta and Northwest announced their merger on April 15, 2008. The 
merger was approved by the Department of Justice on October 29, 2008 and completed 
on December 31, 2009. The merged airline, which took the Delta name, became the 
largest airline in the world at the time. United Airlines and Continental Airlines began 
discussing a merger in February 2008 but broke off merger negotiations in April 
2008. The two airlines resumed talks and signed an alliance pact in June 2008 to link 
technologies and share networks and passenger perks. On May 2, 2010, the boards 
of directors of each airline approved a deal to combine the two airlines and overtake 
Delta as the new largest airline in the world. The merger was publicly announced the 
next day. The Department of Justice approved the merger on August 27, 2010 and the 
merger was completed on October 1, 2010. The combined airline began operating 
under the United name on November 30, 2011. 
 Mergers have potential to create efficiency gains from economies of scale 
and scope, but the newly merged firm may also exercise market power effects and 
charge higher fares to consumers or steal market share from competitors. These two 
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mergers had the potential to greatly impact consumers by creating such large players 
in the aviation industry. An analysis of the effect of the mergers on airfares can be 
useful in retrospectively analyzing the government’s decision to approve the mergers. 
Furthermore, it can be useful for analyzing whether the government should approve 
similar mergers between large airlines in today’s aviation market. For instance, an 
empirical analysis of the effect of these mergers on airfares may shed light on the 
potential effects of the merger between American Airlines and US Airways that was 
approved in November 2013, and also created a new largest airline in the world.
II. Literature Review
A. History of U.S. Antitrust Policy 
 
 Antitrust policy began in the United States in response to many large national 
companies engaging in monopolistic practices at the end of the 19th century. The 
Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 and the Sherman Act of 1890 were designed to 
prevent trusts — a term that was eventually used to describe all forms of suspect 
business combinations — from using monopoly power against the public interest. 
Specifically, the Sherman Act was passed in response to Rockefeller’s Standard Oil 
Company allegedly engaging in predatory pricing to drive out competition and then 
obtain monopoly profits by restricting output and raising prices. Congress then passed 
the Clayton Antitrust Act in 1914 to explicitly outlaw more activities. As interpreted by 
the Court, certain actions or structures are illegal per se, meaning they are inherently 
illegal, while others are analyzed according to the rule of reason. For instance, price 
fixing and other horizontal agreements between distinct companies are generally 
illegal per se. Horizontal and vertical mergers and predatory pricing are subject to 
examination under the rule of reason, meaning they are illegal if and only if it can be 
demonstrated that they are anticompetitive (Clarkson and Miller 1982).
 Anticompetitive mergers are banned under Section 7 of the Clayton Act. Over 
time the Court has held that in order to establish a case against a merger, there must 
be a trend toward concentration in the industry, the proposed merger must increase 
concentration, the merged firm must have an undue market share, and there must be 
difficult entry into the market. Possible defenses include increases in efficiency and 
the failing company defense — if the acquired firm is failing, the Court usually allows 
the merger since the acquired firm was not a viable competitor before the merger 
(Clarkson and Miller 1982).
 The Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission both publish 
merger guidelines. In August 2010, the two government agencies jointly published 
“Horizontal Merger Guidelines.” The government uses several forms of evidence to 
predict the competitive effects of a merger. Sometimes, the government uses the actual 
effects observed if it is challenging a consummated merger, but usually it challenges 
mergers before they are consummated and must rely on predictive analysis. For this, 
it uses comparisons to similar mergers, assessments of market share concentration and 
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changes in market power, assessments of competition between the two merging firms, 
and whether the merger eliminates a firm with the potential to disrupt the industry with 
new technology (DOJ and FTC, 2010). 
 The DOJ and FTC rely on market concentration as one useful indicator of 
the competitive effects of a merger. The agencies often use the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI) to measure market concentration. The HHI is calculated by summing the 
squares of each individual firm’s market share. The government considers both the 
post-merger HHI and the change in HHI from the merger. Change in HHI measures the 
amount of overlap between the two merging firms (Kim and Singal 1993). The agencies 
generally classify markets with HHI below 1500 as unconcentrated, HHI between 1500 
and 2500 as moderately concentrated, and HHI above 2500 as highly concentrated. A 
change in HHI of less than 100 is considered a small change in concentration, a change 
between 100 and 200 is considered a moderate change, and a change above 200 is 
considered a large change. Mergers involving either a small change in concentration 
or mergers that result in an unconcentrated market are both unlikely to have adverse 
anticompetitive effects and usually do not require further analysis. Mergers resulting 
in a moderately concentrated market and a moderate or large change in concentration 
raise significant competitive concerns and often warrant government scrutiny. Mergers 
resulting in highly concentrated markets and a moderate change in concentration often 
warrant scrutiny. Finally, mergers resulting in highly concentrated markets and large 
change in concentration are presumed to enhance market power unless the merging 
companies prove otherwise with sufficient evidence (DOJ and FTC 2010).
 
B. The American Aviation Industry
 The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 had a substantial impact on the 
organization of the airline industry. Prior to the Act, airlines had to seek regulatory 
approval from the Civil Aeronautics Board in order to service routes or change fares. 
This regulation essentially served as a barrier to entry that promoted monopolies on 
certain routes. The Deregulation Act also removed controls overs fares and the entry 
of new airlines into the industry (Weisman 1990). This led to a wave of entry, which 
lowered profits per firm, which led to the wave of mergers in the 1980s studied by 
Kim and Singal (1993) (Bittlingmayer 1985). The Act lowered average fare (adjusted 
for inflation) and increased passenger loads. However, it also forced many airlines 
into bankruptcy and consolidation (Weisman 1990). It also led to firms employing 
the hub-and-spoke approach that is described further in the next section (Shy 1995, 
Borenstein 1989). This system enabled larger carriers to establish market power over 
hubs. The growth of low-cost air carriers like Southwest and JetBlue also led to more 
direct flights offered.
 
C. Economic Theory
 One of the unique features about the aviation industry is that airlines not 
42           SPICE | Philosophy, Politics, and Economics Undergraduate Journal
Effect of Airline Mergers on Airfare
only set a price and quantity, but also a networking structure. Airlines strategically 
decide to either offer direct flights or stopover flights via the hub-and-spoke approach 
(Bittlingmayer 1990). For instance, Shy (1995) presents a basic model with a 
monopolist firm and three cities that demonstrates making one city a hub can save 
costs since the airlines only needs to operate two routes instead of three. Specifically, 
the hub-and-spoke approach is less costly if the fixed cost of operating the route is 
large relative to the number of passengers in each route (Shy 1995). Deregulation of 
the industry led to more competition and fewer passengers per route per airline, which 
in part explains why deregulation caused many airlines to shift towards the hub-and-
spoke approach (Borenstein 1989).
 Shy (1995) presents a consumer demand model:
Ui=diδ + √fi-pi  if pi ≤ diδ+√fi and fi≥0, and 0 otherwise, where di is a dummy variable 
that captures whether a flight is direct (di=1) or not (di=0), δ represents how much more 
a consumer is willing to pay for a direct flight than a stopover flight, fi represents the 
frequency of flights, and √fi  represents consumers’ additional utility gain from more 
frequent flights. Shy (1995) chooses to use frequency (departures per day) instead of 
passengers per route to measure output since costs depend more on departures per 
unit of time than on passengers per flight and since frequency influences passengers’ 
utility. While informative, this model is not particularly useful for analyzing strategic 
decisions in a competitive environment.
 There is debate in the literature over whether the government (specifically, 
the Civil Aeronautics Board) should regulate the industry by setting a minimum 
airfare to prevent strict competition where prices converge to marginal costs as seen 
in the Bertrand model. Judge Richard Posner (1975) offers an argument against such 
regulation. First, the industry is at an equilibrium where price p0 is equal to each firm’s 
identical per passenger cost c0., following a Bertrand model. Suppose the CAB sets 
a minimum airfare pmin above p0=co so that firms can make a positive per unit profit. 
Posner (1975) predicts that airlines will start to compete on services like food, drinks 
and frequency of flights since they are legally prohibited from competing on price by 
charging below pmin. This competition will raise each firm’s per unit cost to c1=pmin and 
per unit profit will again equal zero. Furthermore, passengers will reduce their number 
of flights purchased after the regulation. Granted, demand may shift out, but Posner 
still predicts the new equilibrium quantity will be lower than before regulation. This 
argument relies on the fact that demand will not shift out that much after firms improve 
their services, since if consumers cared that much about services, the firms would have 
competed on services before price regulation was imposed (Posner 1975, Shy 1995).
 An important area to explore is a theoretical description of the competition 
between firms. Gelman and Salop (1983) present a theory called Judo Economics to 
describe potential competition between a large firm and a small entrant. Consider a 
two stage sequential game with an incumbent and potential entrant. The potential 
entrant first chooses whether to enter, its capacity k, and its price pe. The incumbent 
then chooses its price pI in the second stage. In the model, the incumbent firm is large 
and has an unlimited capacity (or at least sufficient to cater to all consumers who the 
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demand the product). Like in Bertrand competition, consumers prefer the brand with 
the lower price, and the firm with a lower price captures the entire demand given its 
capacity. The incumbent firm has two options in the second stage (all but these two 
are weakly dominated). It can fight the entrant by setting pI=pe (the model assumes 
the incumbent captures all of the demand when prices are equal) or accommodate by 
setting its price at its profit maximizing price. If the entrant’s price is lower than the 
incumbent’s price, the entrant gets his capacity k, and the incumbent gets the rest of 
the demand. If the entrant’s price is greater than or equal to the incumbent’s price, the 
incumbent gets all of the demand. Gelman and Salop (1983) show that there exists a 
sufficiently low combination of capacity k and price pe set by the entrant such that the 
incumbent will find it profitable to accommodate entry rather than fight.
While this model does not sufficiently explain the competitive environment 
in all routes, it can help explain why on some routes we observe a large firm with 
substantial market share and a small firm with lower prices and a small but non-
negligible market share. The intuition behind cooperation in infinitely repeated 
games, given firms’ strategies and their discount rates, may help explain why we see 
firms maintain positive profits despite Bertrand’s result that prices should converge 
to marginal cost in a competitive environment with identical goods (Axelrod 1982).
D. Empirical Approaches
 Kim and Singal (1993) present several different empirical methods for 
analyzing the effects of airline mergers. Their analysis relies on comparing sample 
routes with control routes to see how mergers affect airfare. Sample routes are those 
served by at least one of the merging airlines in the study looking at mergers in the 
1980s (the “merger wave” following deregulation). Control routes are routes on which 
neither of the merging firms operated and whose distance falls within 7.5 percent of 
that of the sample route. Their analysis relies heavily on the assumption that industry 
wide changes like fluctuations in fuel price, labor cost, and seasonal or cyclical changes 
in demand are likely to have equivalent effects on routes of similar distance. 
The authors compare the fare changes of the sample routes with the fare 
changes of the control routes: Log fare change = log(farese/fare
s
b)-log(fare
c
e/fare
c
b) 
where c is control, s is sample, e is end of a period, and b is beginning of a period. 
The authors test the hypothesis that that this variable is statistically different from 0. 
They also test whether the relative fares (a ratio of sample to control) are statistically 
different from 1.
 Kim and Singal’s (1993) main analysis is to regress log fare change on the 
change in HHI while controlling for whether or not the acquired firm was financially 
distressed before the merger and the route distance, which affects the viability of rail 
and bus as substitutes. The change in HHI is calculated as log(HHIse/HHI
s
b)-log(HHI
c
e/
HHIcb). As previously discussed with the DOJ and FTC guidelines (2010), the change 
in HHI measures the amount of overlap between the two merging firms. If firms have a 
lot of overlapping routes, then there is more of an opportunity for gains and for market 
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power effects. The authors contend that if market power effects dominate efficiency 
gains, then the change in HHI will be positively correlated with the change in price, 
and if efficiency gains dominate, this correlation will be negative. 
The authors separate financially distressed mergers from normal mergers 
since financially distressed firms are more concerned with avoiding bankruptcy and 
may not change pricing behavior until the merger is completed. The authors also 
separate the announcement period of the merger from the completion period because 
market power effects may start to take place when firms start to discuss the possibility 
of merging and tacit cooperation ensues, while efficiency gains from economies of 
scale and scope are not observed until the merger is consummated. The authors further 
differentiate between mergers where the firms have overlapping routes, hubs, both or 
neither. Firms that share both routes and hubs have the most potential for efficiency 
gains and market power effects, while firms that share neither should have the least 
potential for both efficiency gains and market power effects (Kim and Singal 1993).
The authors find that for normal firm mergers, the coefficient of log fare 
change when regressed on change in HHI is statistically significant and positive during 
the announcement period, negative during the completion period, and negative during 
the full period — meaning that efficiency gains dominate for most types of mergers. 
However, market power effects dominate for mergers where the firms share neither a 
hub nor route, and these mergers account for 76% of the sample. The authors predict 
that mergers in the subsample of airlines that share neither a hub nor route should not 
see efficiency gains or market power effects, and are puzzled by why market power 
effects are observed. Bernheim and Whinston (1990) offer a possible explanation 
based on the idea of multimarket contact. Firms that compete in many networks are 
more likely to tacitly collude on price. In other words, say firms X and Y compete on 
several routes, some of which are dominated by X and some by Y. Firm X may not 
undercut Y in a route where Y dominates in order to protect its own dominance in other 
routes. Mergers make this oligopolistic result more likely. The authors conclude by 
noting that mergers generally increased airfare by around 10% for the merging firms, 
and rival firms responded with proportional increases in price (Kim and Singal 1993).
 Ma, Sun and Tang (2004) present one example of using stock valuations rather 
than prices to analyze mergers with their study of the railroad industry. The authors 
find that events that made the Sante Fe and Southern Pacific merger less likely had a 
negative impact on stock prices for the two firms and their rivals since these events 
lowered the probability of all future mergers, which the authors allege the investors 
thought added value to the firms because of market power effects.
 Kim and Singal (1993) offer a critique of these stock market based analyses, 
specifically of the study by at Eckbo (1989). First, events impact the probability of 
the relevant merger and all future mergers. This is a problem since a positive event 
will make rival firms less valuable since they make the merger more likely and the 
merging firms will have market power effects that hurt their rivals, but also make rival 
firms more valuable since it increases the probability they will merge and become 
more valuable in the future. Second, the period between a merger announcement and 
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completion is relatively long, usually lasting about a year. This is too long to make 
meaningful inferences regarding the impact of antitrust challenges on stock prices. 
In addition, antitrust challenges reduce the positive effect of market power and the 
negative effect of efficiency gains. These stock market based studies only look at the 
net effect of a merger without differentiating these two distinct effects. Finally, these 
tests are too indirect since stock market data aggregates a firm’s performance in all 
markets, while a merger may affect a firm’s market power in just a fraction of its 
business. 
 Another way of evaluating the effects of a horizontal merger is by treating 
it similar to a cartel (Schmalensee and Willig 1989). In calculating damages from 
cartels designed to fix prices, researchers often rely on a model that predicts what 
prices would have been “but-for” the alleged conspiracy and calculate overcharges 
by comparing this but-for price with the actual observed price (Nieberding 2006). 
This type of regression can only be used after a merger has occurred since it relies on 
comparing predicted data with actual observed data.
 There are two commonly used methods to estimate overcharge: the dummy 
variable approach and the forecasting approach (Nieberding 2006). The dummy 
variable approach adds a dummy variable equal to 1 when the conspiracy is in effect 
and 0 when it is not. If the dependent variable is expressed as the log of price, then the 
coefficient of this dummy variable indicates the overcharge from the cartel (Rubinfeld 
and Steiner 1983). The model uses data from both the conspiracy and nonconspiracy 
period to predict prices during the conspiracy period. This is both a weakness and 
strength of the model. One can argue that conspiracy data should be used and therefore 
the forecasting model ignores relevant data, and one can argue that conspiracy data 
should not be used to predict but-for prices since overcharges may vary throughout the 
period. One way around this problem is to create more dummy variables for different 
subsets of the period to capture the different overcharges, but if a dummy variable 
is created for every possible period, the model becomes identical to the forecasting 
model (Rubinfeld and Steiner 1983). 
 The forecasting model uses only data from periods not affected by the 
conspiracy to predict what prices would have been but for the collusive behavior. 
Researchers try to construct a regression that accurately predicts observed prices from 
before the conspiracy and then use this regression to predict but for prices. Overcharges 
are then calculated by comparing these prices with actual observed prices during the 
conspiracy (Nieberding 2006). Similar models can be used to predict what prices on 
a route affected by a merger would have been but-for the merger, and the effect of the 
merger on airfares can be described the same way overcharge is calculated in price-
fixing antitrust schemes. 
III. Description of Data
A. Flight Data
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 The dataset used in this analysis contains quarterly data from the final 
quarter of 2000 to the second quarter of 2013. The data comes from the Department 
of Transportation’s Domestic Airline Fares Consumer Report and is publicly available 
online.1 The data is organized by route, which is defined as a one-way unique 
combination of origin and destination. For each route in a given quarter, the data 
gives the following information: distance (in miles), passengers per day, average fare 
(dollars), the largest carrier, the market share of the largest carrier, the average fare for 
the largest carrier, the lowest fare carrier, the market share of the lowest fare carrier, 
and average fare for the lowest fare carrier. Origin and destination are coded only as 
cities and do not indicate airport. 
Table 1 shows average fare of the largest carrier, average fare of all carriers, 
and average passengers per day for routes where Delta or Northwest is the largest 
carrier. Both fare values are adjusted for inflation by converting to 2009 dollars using 
the Consumer Price Index, obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. I limit the 
data to routes where Delta or Northwest is the largest carrier so that I can use Delta or 
Northwest’s actual fare in my analysis. Table 2 shows the same information, limited to 
combinations of routes between New York, Atlanta, Cincinnati, Detroit, Minneapolis 
and Salt Lake City on which Delta or Northwest in the largest carrier. These six cities 
all contain airports that are Delta hubs (see Table 12). Delta’s hub in Detroit was 
acquired through the merger. Northwest also had a hub in Minneapolis, which is an 
overlapping hub and creates more opportunities for efficiency gains. As I will discuss 
later, my analysis samples different routes for each merger. I choose hubs since Delta 
is more likely to be the largest carrier on routes between its hubs, and since these 
routes are busy and are likely to contain a relatively high number of passengers per 
day. The public and government should be more concerned with manifestations of 
market power effects on busy routes with a relatively high number of passengers per 
day since the higher fares affect more consumers.
 The before period in Table 1 is from the beginning of the sample to the first 
quarter of 2008. The merger was announced in the second quarter of 2008 on April 14. 
The announcement period is the period between the announcement of the merger and 
completion of the merger. It begins with the second quarter of 2008 and ends with the 
final quarter of 2009, as the merger was completed on December 31, 2009. The after 
merger period (also referred to as the completion period) begins with the first quarter 
of 2010 and ends with the second quarter of 2013, which is the last quarter for which 
data is available. 
Table 1: Fares and passengers where Delta or Northwest is largest carrier
Average Fare 
(Delta-North-
west)
Std 
Dev
Average 
Fare (all 
airlines)
Std 
Dev
Passengers 
per day
Std 
Dev
1  http://www.dot.gov/policy/aviation-policy/domestic-airline-fares-consumer-report
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Before Merger $270 75 $256 65 1171 1579
Announcement 
Period
$266 75 $252 70 1106 1504
After Merger $273 47 $258 40 1116 1446
Table 2: Fares and passengers where Delta or Northwest is largest carrier, limited to 
hubs
In both datasets, Delta or Northwest’s fare goes down during the announcement 
period and up during the completion period. On all routes where Delta or Northwest is 
the largest carrier, Delta or Northwest’s average fare after the merger is just below the 
average fare before the merger. On the routes that I sample, Delta or Northwest’s fare 
during the completion period rises to above what it was before the merger. The average 
fare over all airlines similarly falls during the announcement period then rises during 
the completion period over all routes where Delta or Northwest is the largest carrier 
and in my sample. Passengers per day also falls during the announcement period 
then rises during the completion period for both the larger dataset and the sampled 
routes. For all routes and for the sample, passengers per day remains relatively steady. 
Analyzing these numbers without controlling for other factors that may impact price is 
not too useful, and not much can be said about the effects of the merger from this data 
alone. Fares are slightly higher in the sample than the entire dataset and passengers 
per day is significantly higher. This was expected, as the sample was not intended to 
be representative but was chosen since these routes tend have the most observations 
where one of the airlines is the largest carrier, and since effects from the merger are 
more interesting on these busier routes.
Tables 3 and 4 are look at the same information as Tables 1 and 2, respectively, 
but for the Continental-United merger. The time periods are defined the same way. The 
merger was announced on May 3, 2010 and completed on October 3, 2010. The before 
period therefore begins in the final quarter of 2000 and ends with the first quarter of 
2010. The announcement period goes from the second quarter of 2010 to the third 
quarter of 2010. The completion period begins with the final quarter of 2010 and ends 
with the second quarter of 2013, the final quarter of the data. The hubs used for this 
analysis are Washington, DC, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Chicago, Denver, New York 
Average Fare 
(Delta-North-
west)
Std 
Dev
Average 
Fare (all 
airlines)
Std 
Dev
Passengers 
per day
Std 
Dev
Before Merger $248 69 $244 62 101 346
Announcement 
Period
$242 69 $241 63 99 296
After Merger $247 58 $246 52 102 314
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and Houston (See Table 13). United’s hub in New York (Newark Liberty International 
Airport in Newark, New Jersey) was acquired through the merger. Continental 
Airlines had a hub and was headquartered in Houston, which is an overlapping hub. 
 
Table 3: Fares and passengers where Continental or United is largest carrier
Average Fare 
(Continental-
United)
Std 
Dev
Average Fare 
(all airlines)
Std 
Dev
Passengers 
per day
Std 
Dev
Before Merger $261 76 $253 67 135 400
Announcement 
Period
$248 58 $244 55 100 318
After Merger $266 65 $263 60 152 611
Table 4: Fares and passengers where Continental or United is largest carrier, limited 
to hubs
Average Fare 
(Continental-
United)
Std 
Dev
Average Fare 
(all airlines)
Std 
Dev
Passengers 
per day
Std 
Dev
Before Merger $295 120 $250 93 2433 1055
Announcement 
Period
$268 65 $229 51 2591 583
After Merger $300 77 $253 52 3806 2203
 
 Like in the Delta dataset, the average fare for Continental or United where 
one of the airlines is the largest carrier falls during the announcement period and then 
rises during the completion period. For both the larger dataset and the sample, fares 
rise during the completion period to above what they were before the merger. These 
trends are also true for the average fare of all airlines. For all routes, passengers per 
day falls during the announcement period then rises during the completion period 
to above what it was before the merger. For the sample routes, passengers per day 
rises during the announcement period then again during the completion period. The 
announcement period is only the second and third quarters of 2010, so it may be too 
small to draw any useful conclusions from. Again like the Delta dataset, the sample 
has higher fares and is much busier measured by passengers per day than the average 
over the entire dataset where Continental or United is the largest carrier.
B. Other Data
I obtain data from other sources to control for some factors that may impact airfares. I 
use the Federal Reserve Economic Data’s (FRED) information on disposable income 
per capita. This data is quarterly and already adjusted to 2009 dollars. Unemployment 
comes from the BLS. This dataset contains monthly unemployment rates. I calculate 
quarterly averages for my analysis. I also use the Bureau of Transportation Statistic’s 
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domestic fuel cost per gallon data. I adjust to 2009 dollars using CPI and calculate 
quarterly averages from monthly data.
Tables 5-10 show average fuel cost per 1000 gallons of jet fuel, disposable 
income per capita, and unemployment rate for the periods before, during and after 
each of the two mergers. I also present Figures 1-3 that graph these variables over 
time, and mark the announcement and completion of each merger. The first red line 
marks the announcement of the Delta-Northwest merger in the second quarter of 2008 
and the second marks the completion of the merger at the end of the fourth quarter of 
2009. The first yellow line marks the announcement of the Continental-United merger 
in the second quarter of 2010 and the second marks the completion of the merger at the 
end of the third quarter of 2010. The horizontal axis is year and quarter (for instance, 
20001 is the first quarter of 2000).
Tables 5 and 6 show that for both mergers, the average fuel cost is increasing 
from the before period to the announcement period to the completion period. Figure 1 
demonstrates that fuel cost is steadily rising before the Delta merger. It starts to fall then 
rise again during the completion of the merger. It continues to rise into the announcement 
period of the United merger and levels off around the end of 2011. Figure 1 helps 
illustrate why fuel cost may not be a good variable to control for in a model. Fuel costs 
changes drastically during the announcement period of the Delta merger. The model 
regresses only over the period before the merger, and it is possible that whatever effect 
of fuel cost on airfares it outputs will not hold during the sudden drop in fuel costs. 
 
Table 5: Fuel costs over Delta merger periods 
Average Fuel Cost per 1000 gallons Std Dev
Before Merger $1,409 570
Announcement Period $2,389 665
After Merger $2,733 319
 
Table 6: Fuel costs over Continental merger periods 
Average Fuel Cost per 1000 gallons Std Dev
Before Merger $1,595 688
Announcement Period $2,201 45
After Merger $2,859 188
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Figure 1: Fuel costs over time
 Table 7 shows that for the Delta merger, average disposable income falls 
from the period before the merger to the announcement period then rises during the 
completion period, but is still lower than the average before the merger. Table 8 shows 
that for the United merger, average disposable income is rising from the period before 
the merger to the announcement period to the completion period. Disposable income 
is rising steadily before the Delta merger, as illustrated by Figure 2. It begins to fall 
around the time of the announcement of the merger and continues falling throughout 
the announcement period. It starts to increase again right after the merger is completed 
and continues rising until the end of the dataset, which includes the announcement and 
completion of the United merger. Like fuel costs, the circumstances around disposable 
income are considerably different before and after the merger. Again, it is possible that 
the relationship observed between disposable income and airfares before the merger 
will not continue to hold after as disposable income begins to fall. 
Table 7: Disposable Income over Delta merger periods
Average Disposable Income Std Dev
Before Merger $37,780 1,527
Announcement Period $35,818 432
After Merger $36,382 504
Table 8: Disposable Income over United merger periods
Average Disposable Income Std Dev
Before Merger $34,165 1590
Announcement Period $35,764 69
After Merger $36,560 352
Figure 2: Disposable income over time
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Table 9 shows that average unemployment is rising from the period before the Delta 
merger to the announcement period to the completion period. Table 10 shows that it 
is rising from the period before the United merger to the announcement period then 
falls during the completion period. Figure 3 illustrates that unemployment rate is rising 
from the beginning of the data until the end of 2004, falling until the beginning of 
2008, then starts to rise again just before the Delta merger. It remains between 4% 
and 6% before the merger. It then rises considerably during the announcement period 
of the Delta merger, peaking around 10%. It starts to fall right after the completion of 
the merger, and falls until the end of the dataset, including through the announcement 
and completion of the United merger. The mergers uncoincidentally occur around 
the time of the Great Recession, which significantly impacted unemployment rates. 
It is unlikely that the effect that the regression predicts holds after the merger when 
the circumstances around unemployment are considerably different. Of the variables 
being analyzed, the Great Recession had the largest impact on unemployment. Since 
the mergers happen too close the Recession, I do not use unemployment in either 
specification of the model I present later.
Table 9: Unemployment over Delta merger periods
Average Unemployment Rate Std Dev
Before Merger 5.04% 0.68
Announcement Period 7.90% 1.85
After Merger 8.50% 0.91
Table 10: Unemployment over United merger periods 
Average Unemployment Rate Std Dev
Before Merger 5.65% 1.58
Announcement Period 9.57% 0.09
After Merger 8.23% 0.79
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Figure 3: Unemployment over time
IV. Analysis
A. Variables
 My analysis focuses on creating a model for fares using data before the 
announcement of each of the mergers, using this model to forecast what fares would 
have been after the merger had the merger not occurred, and then comparing the actual 
price after the merger with this calculated but-for price.
 I first limit my dataset to routes where one of the two relevant airlines in each 
merger is the largest carrier. This allows me to use the relevant airline’s actual fares 
in my analysis, by using the variable for the fare of largest fare carrier. I then limit the 
dataset again to routes between one of the relevant airline’s hubs. Tables 12 and 13 
list these hub cities. I choose to sample these routes since there are more observations 
where one of the relevant airlines is the largest carrier, and since these routes tend to 
have more passengers. The public and government should be more interested in the 
effects of the merger on these busier routes.
 Before running my regression, I adjust some of the variables. Fares and fuel 
costs are converted to 2009 dollars using the CPI (I multiply by a ratio of CPI2009/
CPIcurrent year). I calculate quarterly averages for fuel cost and unemployment, which 
are given as monthly data. Fuel cost is multiplied by 1000, so the variable represents 
the cost in 2009 dollars of 1000 gallons of jet fuel. I calculate the natural logarithm of 
distance and multiply fuel cost by distance. I create one, two, three and four quarter lag 
variables, averages over the past two quarters, and averages over the past four quarters 
for fares, fuel costs, disposable income and unemployment. I create dummy variables 
for quarter and city combination. For instance, the dummy variable for the first quarter 
equals 1 if and only if the observation is in the first quarter, and 0 otherwise. Similarly, 
a dummy variable called “New York-Atlanta” equals 1 if and only if the observation is 
a flight between New York and Atlanta in either direction and 0 otherwise.
 I use market share as an independent variable to capture trends of changes 
in concentration on a route. I attempt to control for these trends in order to separate 
changes in market share that happened as a direct result of the merger and changes 
in market share that would have occurred even without the merger. In order to do 
this, I regress market share of the largest carrier on time for observations before the 
announcement of the merger for each of 15 route combinations in the Delta dataset and 
each of the 21 route combinations in the United dataset. I choose to regress only over 
the period before the announcement rather than completion of the merger since there 
may be changes in market share on a given route as a result of the merger even during 
the announcement period before the firms actually combine assets. Kim and Singal 
(1983) predict that merging firms will begin pricing together during the announcement 
period, and market power effects will be observed. The predicted changes in airfares 
and response to these changes may change the merging firms’ market shares. 
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  After regressing market share on time for each route combination, I 
forecast market share. I create a new variable that equals actual market share before 
the merger and predicted market share after the merger. This is the variable I use to 
regress and forecast price. I create route specific lag variables for this market share 
variable. For instance, the one quarter lag of market share of an observation will be 
the market share on that same route in the previous quarter. Using this in my analysis 
allows me to capture the effect of market share on price and control for changes in 
concentration that would have occurred even without the merger. Figure 4 shows the 
actual and predicted market share for Delta-Northwest and Figure 5 shows the same 
for Continental-United. In each figure, the vertical line marks the announcement of 
the merger. Differences before the merger are solely attributed to the error term in the 
regression. Differences after are attributed to this and also to changes in market share 
that were caused by the merger.
Figure 4: Actual and Predicted market share, Delta-Northwest
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Figure 5: Actual and Predicted market share, Continental-United
B. Model
 After running several different specifications of regressing fares on different 
combinations of controls and running sensitivity analyses, I use the following 
specifications of a model to calculate fares:
Specification 1: Fareit = β0 + β1MSlagi,t  + β2FuelCostt + β3DispIncomet  + β4CinDeti + 
β5CinAtl i + β6CinNY i + β7CinMin i + β8CinSL i + β9DetAtl i + β10DetNY i + β11DetMin i 
+ β12DetSL i + β13AtlNY i + β14AtlMin i + β15AtlSL i + β16NYMin i + β17NYSL i + β18Q1t 
+ β19Q2t  + β20Q3t + Ui,t
Specification 2: Fareit = β0 + β1CinDeti + β2CinAtl i + β3CinNY i + β4CinMin i + 
β5CinSL i + β6DetAtl i + β7DetNY i + β8DetMin i + β9DetSL i + β10AtlNY i + β11AtlMin i 
+ β12AtlSL i + β13NYMin i + β14NYSL i + β15Q1t + β16Q2t  + β17Q3t + Ui,t
In the first specification, fare is regressed on market share, fuel cost, 
disposable income, a dummy variable for each route combination except one, and 
a dummy variable for each quarter except one. Market share is the average market 
share over the previous two quarters. This lagged version of market share is used 
since firms are likely to use past data on market share when calculating prices. 
Furthermore, market share can be an effect of fares in addition to a determinant of 
fares. For instance, a firm may gain market share, exercise market power effects and 
increase fares. Alternatively, a firm may lower fares and as a result of this decision 
gain market share from other firms. Using the lagged variables helps to avoid this 
issue of simultaneous causation. Fuel cost is the domestic cost in 2009 dollars of 1000 
gallons of jet fuel. Disposable income is per capita national disposable income. The 
route dummy variables are equal to one if and only if an observation is between the 
two relevant cities. For instance, CinDet = 1 for flights between Cincinnati and Detroit 
and 0 otherwise. One route dummy is dropped to avoid multicollinearity. This model 
is for analysis of the Delta merger. The United model uses route dummies for the 20 
of the 21 different route combinations. Including these dummy variables allows the 
model to pick up route specific characteristics of fares, like the effects of distance, the 
popularity of a route, and the type of passengers typically served. Similarly, quarter 
dummies are equal 1 if and only if the observation occurs in the relevant quarter. For 
instance, Q1 = 1 for observations in the first quarter and 0 otherwise. These variables 
are included to capture the effects of seasons on fares. Some quarters are more popular 
because of holidays and weather patterns. 
I regress only during the period before the announcement of the merger. 
Therefore, the model should ideally describe how different variables affected fares 
prior to the merger. Using these coefficients to forecast fares therefore captures the but-
for fares. I predict prices over the announcement period (between announcement and 
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completion), the completion period (between completion and the end of the dataset), 
and the entire period. Table 11 shows the different time periods used for predicting fares. 
 
Table 11: Time periods
Regression Period Prediction Period
Before Announce-
ment
Announcement Period
Before Announce-
ment
Completion Period
Before Announce-
ment
Full Period
Table 12: Delta hubs used for sample routes
City Airport Notes
Cincinnati, 
Ohio
Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky 
International Airport
Detroit, 
Michigan
Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County 
Airport
Acquired in merger
Atlanta, 
Georgia
Hartsfield-Jackson International 
Airport
Delta headquarters
New York City, 
New York
LaGuardia Airport, John F.  Ken-
nedy International Airport
Minneapolis, 
Minnesota
Minneapolis-Saint Paul Interna-
tional Airport
Overlapping hub, 
former Northwest 
headquarters
Salt Lake City, 
Utah
Salt Lake City International Airport
Table 13: United hubs used for sample routes
City Airport Notes
Washington, 
DC
Washington Dulles International 
Airport
San Francisco, 
California
San Francisco International Airport
Los Angeles, 
California
Los Angeles International Airport
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Chicago, 
Illinois
O’Hare International Airport United headquarters
Denver, 
Colorado
Denver International Airport
New York City, 
New York
Newark Liberty International 
Airport
Acquired in merger
Houston, 
Texas
George Bush Intercontinental 
Airport
Overlapping hub, 
largest hub, former 
Continental head-
quarters
C. Predictions
 I hypothesize that as market share increases, fares will increase. As market 
share increases, a firm may exercise market power effects. Without a merger, there 
are no reasons to expect significant efficiency gains from increases in market power. 
However, a firm may engage in predatory pricing and lower prices to further increase 
its market share. Fuel cost should be positively correlated with fares since an increase 
in fuel cost is best captured as a shift inwards of a firm’s supply curve, which results 
in a higher equilibrium fare at a lower equilibrium quantity (passengers). Disposable 
income should be positively correlated with both fares and passengers. Increases in 
income can be illustrated as a shift outwards in demand, which results in a higher 
equilibrium price and quantity. 
 Kim and Singal (1983) predict that only market power effects are observed 
during the announcement period, and both market power effects and efficiency gains 
are observed during the completion period. This result can be tested by overcharged 
for each period.
V. Results
A. Regression Results
 Table 14 shows the regression results for specification 1 of the Delta merger. 
The coefficient of average market share of the past two quarters is negative but 
statistically insignificant. There are a few explanations for why the effect of market 
share in previous quarters on current fare is not statistically significant. First, market 
share is an imperfect measure since it ignores the number of competitors and their 
market shares. A firm with 40% of the market share may face one competitor with 
60% of the market share, six competitors with 10% of the market share each, or ten 
competitors with 6% of the market share each. The market share variable does not give 
enough information on the competitive environment of a given route. Furthermore, the 
average market share over the past two periods does not capture any predicted changes 
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in market share in the current period that the firm may anticipate. Furthermore, the 
model may be picking up on the effect that an increase in price may cause a decrease in 
market share. In other words, price is affecting market share rather than market share 
affecting price. Even though the model uses a lag of market share, it may still pick up 
on this effect since fares today are correlated with past fares.
 The coefficient of fuel cost is negative, which is the opposite of what I 
predicted. There is no plausible explanation for why an increase in fuel cost would 
lower fares, so this must be the result of omitted variable bias or trying to capture 
an effect for a variable that does not determine fares. Figure 1 illustrates that before 
the merger, fuel cost was increasing at a steady rate. The regression may be using 
this variable to capture a decreasing trend in fares over time not related to fuel costs. 
The coefficient of disposable income is positive as predicted. The coefficient of 
Q1, Q2 and Q2 are all positive, which means that everything else equal, fares are 
higher during these quarters and lower during the fourth quarter. The route dummies 
capture city specific effects. Figure 6 shows Delta or Northwest’s actual fares and 
the fares predicted by this regression. The vertical lines indicate the announcement 
and completion of the merger. A comparison of the actual fares with predicted fares 
before the announcement of the merger indicates how well the regression output fits 
with actual fares. The difference between the actual fare and the predicted fare in 
this portion of the graph is attributed solely to the error term in the regression. The 
difference between the actual fare and the predicted fare after the announcement of the 
merger is attributed to both the error term of the regression and also the effects of the 
merger.
Table 14: Delta Regression Results, specification 1
Variable Coefficient Standard Error P-Value
MS last 2 quarters -.008 .323 0.980
Fuel cost -.014 .011 .011
Disp income last 2 quarters .009 .005 .087
Q1 24.366 5.983 0.000
Q2 21.418 6.195 0.001
Q3 12.195 6.165 0.049
CinDet 37.251 12.070 .002
CinAtl 64.487 18.107 0.000
CinNY 42.579 13.903 0.002
CinMin 32.061 12.061 0.008
CinSL 71.984 14.719 0.000
DetAtl -98.701 11.646 0.000
DetNY -70.453 12.191 0.000
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DetMin 68.859 16.428 0.000
DetSL -22.284 12.102 0.066
AtlNY -67.806 111.954 0.000
AtlMin -87.687 11.777 0.000
AtlSL 68.594 12.574 0.000
NYMin 69.897 12.000 0.000
NYSL 3.620 11.789 0.759
Constant -53.689 170.961 0.754
 
 Table 15 shows results for the second specification of the regression for the 
Delta merger. It uses only quarter and route dummies. All quarter dummies are positive 
again, meaning that for any route, fares are higher in the first three quarters and lower 
in the fourth. The coefficients of the route dummies are not too different than in the 
previous specification. Figure 7 plots actual fares with the fares predicted from this 
specification of the regression.
Table 15: Delta Regression Results, specification 2
Variable Coefficient Standard Error P-value
Q1 23.626 5.834 0.000
Q2 20.882 6.143 0.001
Q3 12.131 6.143 0.049
CinDet 37.172 11.656 0.002
CinAtl 69.146 11.656 0.000
CinNY 42.392 11.626 0.000
CinMin 31.983 11.757 0.006
CinSL 71.762 11.656 0.000
DetAtl -98.689 11.656 0.000
DetNY -70.543 11.656 0.000
DetMin 69.574 11.656 0.000
DetSL -22.574 11.778 0.056
AtlNY -67.874 11.656 0.000
AtlMin -87.642 11.656 0.000
AtlSL 68.476 11.656 0.000
NYMin 69.824 11.656 0.000
NYSL 3.573 11.656 0.759
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Constant 243.788 9.071 0.000
NYMin 69.897 12.000 0.000
NYSL 3.620 11.789 0.759
Constant -53.689 170.961 0.754
Table 16 shows results for the first specification of the United regression. 
Average market share for a route over the past two quarters is again negative but 
not statistically significant. The discussion of this variable from the Delta regression 
applies here as well. The coefficient of fuel cost is now positive as predicted, but no 
longer statistically significant. The coefficient of disposable income per capita over the 
last two quarters is now negative. This is the opposite of what I predicted, and there 
is no plausible explanation for this effect. It is likely due to omitted variable bias, or 
the regression creating an effect for a variable that does not determine fare and using 
the increasing trend in disposable income (see Figure 2) to offset a decreasing trend 
in prices. Firms may price according to disposable income in the origin or destination 
city, in which case this variable that captures the national average is too imprecise. 
Alternatively, firms may not use disposable income to determine price, or perhaps the 
lag variable does not best capture the effect of income on price since firms can predict 
income in a current quarter and use this prediction rather than past data. 
Again, the coefficients of the quarter dummies are all positive, but smaller 
than in specification 1 of the Delta regression. Some of the coefficients of the route 
dummies are dropped due to either collinearity issues or insufficient data for a 
route. Some of the dummy variable coefficients that are calculated are significantly 
higher than those in the Delta regressions. For instance, the coefficient of SFNY is 
278.509 and the coefficient DCSF is 325.008. Figure 8 plots United or Continental’s 
actual fares and the fares predicted from this regression. Again, the region before 
the announcement of the merger illustrates the fitness of the regression. Comparing 
actual fares with predicted fares in the region after the announcement demonstrates 
the effects of the merger.
Table 16: United	 Regression	 Results,	 specification	 1	
Variable Coefficient Standard Error P-Value
MS last 2 quarters -.408 0.575 0.479
Fuel cost 0.012 0.012 0.301
Disp income last 2 qs -.025 0.006 0.000
Q1 7.662 7.884 0.332
Q2 5.440 8.823 0.538
Q3 8.210 8.543 0.337
DCSF 325.008 40.722 0.000
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DCLA 220.412 37.799 0.000
DCChi 33.747 39.723 0.396
DCDen 162.287 28.745 0.000
SFLA -14.464 40.921 0.724
SFChi 125.188 38.309 0.000
SFDen 76.124 40.020 0.058
SFNY 278.509 37.081 0.000
LAChi 57.131 37.085 0.125
LADen 50.760 37.338 0.175
ChiDen 41.205 37.146 0.268
Constant 1023.92 197.38 0.000
 Table 17 shows the results for the second specification of the United 
regression. Again, all quarter dummies are positive, and some route dummies have 
high coefficients, like DCSF at 282.322. Figure 9 plots United or Continental’s actual 
fares with the fares predicted from this specification of the regression. 
Table 17: United	Regression	Results,	specification	2
Variable Coefficient Standard Error P-Value
Q1 10.451 8.605 0.226
Q2 15.793 9.407 0.094
Q3 12.168 9.281 0.191
DCSF 282.322 39.940 0.000
DCLA 183.810 39.940 0.000
DCChi -7.205 39.940 0.857
DCDen 123.302 39.940 0.002
SFLA -61.436 39.757 0.123
SFChi 88.581 39.554 0.026
SFDen 26.140 39.555 0.509
SFNY 247.458 40.357 0.000
LAChi 31.358 40.438 0.439
LADen 6.112 39.602 0.0877
ChiDen -2.080 39.555 0.958
Constant 203.502 30.046 0.000
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Figure 6: Actual and Predicted fares, Delta merger, specification 
Figure 7: Actual and Predicted fares, Delta merger, specification 2
Figure 8: Actual and Predicted fares, United merger, specification 1
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Figure 9: Actual and Predicted fares, United merger, specification 2
B. Overcharges
 Tables 18 and 19 quantitatively analyze the effects of the merger using a 
weighted overcharge. I calculate overcharge as [(Actual Fare – Predicted Fare)/Actual 
Fare] for each observation. I also calculate revenue as (Fare x Passengers Per Day). 
I then take the sum of revenue for the announcement period, the completion period 
and the full period after the merger. I then calculate three different revenue shares 
for an observation as revenue of observation/revenue of period, where the period is 
the announcement, completion or full period. I then multiply the overcharge of an 
observation by each of these three weights. The values in the tables represent the 
sums of these weighted overcharges over each respective period. I do this for each 
specification of the regression. In other words, under specification 1 of the model, 
Delta’s fares are 12.54% lower than what they would have been but-for the merger 
during the announcement period, 19.20% higher than what they would have been but-
for the merger during the completion period, and 16.41% higher than what they would 
have been but-for the merger during the full period. Specification 2 of the model 
calculates a lower (more negative) overcharge during the announcement period, a 
lower overcharge during the completion period, and a lower overcharge during the 
full period than does specification 1. It is interesting to note that overcharges are 
negative during the announcement period. This goes against Kim and Singal’s (1983) 
prediction that only market power effects are observed during the announcement 
period. In fact, prices are lower than what they would have been but-for the merger 
during this period, possibly due to efficiency gains from the merger. Overcharges 
are positive during the completion period, indicating that there are market power 
effects. These market power effects dominate whatever efficiency gains do exist. 
Overcharges for the entire period are also positive, indicating that overall, prices were 
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higher after the merger than what they would have been had the merger not occurred. 
 
Table 18: Delta Weighted Overcharge
Specification 1 Weighted Overcharge Specification 2 Weighted Overcharge
Announcement -12.54% Announcement -21.10%
Completion 19.20% Completion 4.32%
Full 16.41% Full 2.08%
Table 19 shows the same overcharges for the Continental-United merger. 
Under both specifications of the regression, overcharges are negative during the 
announcement period, again going against predictions from economic theory. There 
seem to be efficiency gains during the announcement period, even though the merging 
firms have not yet actually merged. Overcharges during the completion period are 
positive under both specifications of the regression. Again, the firm appears to be 
exercising market power effects once the merger is completed. Overcharges throughout 
the entire period from the announcement of the merger until the end of the dataset are 
positive according to both specifications of the regression.
Table 19: United Merger Weighted Overcharge
Specification 1 Weighted Overcharge Specification 2 Weighted Overcharge
Announcement -4.89% Announcement -3.44%
Completion 4.30% Completion 5.33%
Full 2.88% Full 3.02%
It appears that both mergers raised airfares above what they would have 
been had the mergers not occurred. Any efficiency gains resulting from these mergers 
are dominated by the large newly merged firms exercising market power effects and 
raising airfares.
VI. Conclusion
 The first specification of the regression had several coefficients whose signs 
did not match predictions and were not plausible. Some of these occurred due to 
drastic changes in the variables shortly after the announcement of the merger, some 
of these due to the coincidence of the mergers and the Great Recession. Nevertheless, 
the regression may retain value due to its ability to accurately track airfares before 
the merger. Because of these odd results, I also use the second specification of the 
regression stripped down of market share, disposable income and fuel costs. Speciation 
2 may have more predictive value than specification 1. It controls for fewer variables, 
but these variables were either statistically insignificant or their effect on airfares did 
not cohere with economic theory.
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 The aviation industry has several unique features that may explain why 
certain variables may not affect fares as expected. First, different airlines include 
different services with fares while others do not. For instance, some airlines charge 
extra to check bags, use in-flight services, or even sit in a window seat or an emergency 
exit row. In addition, consumers participate in loyalty programs like miles rewards 
that may influence their decision to choose one airline over another. Furthermore, 
a significant part of choosing a flight is the convenience of its departure and arrival 
times. Consumers are willing to pay more for flights that better fit with their schedules. 
The data does not account for this in any way. Additionally, some airlines have better 
on-time performance than others, and consumers pay more for an airline’s reliability. 
These factors that influence demand and therefore price are not accounted for in the 
data. 
 Nevertheless, despite its flaws, the model shows that both the Delta-Northwest 
merger and the United-Continental merger raised airfares above what they would have 
been without the merger for the routes that I sampled. While it is difficult to draw 
generalizations that apply to the American Airlines-US Airways merger, it appears 
that the trend towards consolidation and the creation of behemoth airlines (each of the 
three mergers created a new largest airline in the world) may hurt consumers by raising 
airfares.
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